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Abstract
Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Keene. Part II reviews the legislative history
of FARA, which shows that Congress fully understood “political propaganda” to be derogatory.
Part III discusses the first amendment implications of the Court’s decision.
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HEAT NOT LIGHT: THE FOREIGN AGENTS
REGISTRATION ACT AFTER MEESE v. KEENE
INTRODUCTION
In January 1983, the United States Department of Justice
informed the National Film Board of Canada that three docu-
mentary films' that it had distributed in the United States con-
stituted "political propaganda," as defined in the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 ("FARA" or "the Act").2
The Film Board did not dispute the Justice Department's de-
termination; instead, it informed its United States distributors
that they would have to assist in complying with the Act by
labeling the films as political propaganda and by disclosing in-
formation on their dissemination.- Barry Keene, a lawyer and
member of the California State Senate, wanted to show the
films to express his political views. He sued the Attorney
General on first amendment grounds, alleging that the propa-
ganda label deterred him from showing the films because it of-
ficially designated them as biased and distorted.4 In Meese v.
1. Two of the films, Acid from Heaven (National Film Board of Canada) and Acid
Rain: Requiem or Recovery (National Film Board of Canada), concerned acid rain, de-
scribed at the time by Canada's Minister of the Environment as "the single greatest
irritant to the United States-Canadian relationship from the Canadian point of view."
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1982, at 12, col.I (quoting John Roberts). Washington Post col-
umnist Mary McGrory said of Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery: "[a] more tactful, neu-
tral, inoffensive presentation of a fearful problem that is being visited on one country
(theirs) by another country (ours) cannot be imagined." Note, Neutral Propaganda:
Three Films "Made in Canada" and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 7 CoMM/ENr LJ.
435, 436-37 n. 13 (1985) (quoting McGrory,Justice Department's Boos Make Film Subjects
Boffo Box Office, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 1983, at A3, col. a.).
The third film, If You Love This Planet (National Film Board of Canada), featured
Dr. Helen Caldicott and concerned the dangers of nuclear war. In 1982 it won the
Academy Award as Best Short Documentary. Note, Neutral Propaganda, supra, at 436-
37 n.13; Court Voids Use of 'Propaganda' Label, NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring 1986, at 12.
2. Ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621
(1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
3. See 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (disclosure requirements), (b) (labeling requirement)
(1982).
4. Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Cal. 1983). The appellee
claimed that if he were to show films that the government had labeled "political
propaganda," "his personal, political, and professional reputation would suffer and
his ability to obtain re-election and to practice his profession would be impaired." Id.
at 1515.
"POLITICAL PROPAGANDA"
Keene, 5 however, the United States Supreme Court held that
the term "political propaganda," as used in FARA, is not pejo-
rative.' The Court thus decided that the label "political propa-
ganda" does not burden speech."
This Comment argues that the government's use of the
term "political propaganda" amounts to an unconstitutional
inhibition of speech. Part I discusses the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Keene. Part II reviews the legislative history of FARA,
which shows that Congress fully understood "political propa-
ganda" to be derogatory. Part III discusses the first amend-
ment implications of the Court's decision. This Comment con-
cludes that the Act's worthwhile disclosure aims can be pre-
served without sacrificing first amendment rights by cleansing
the statute of pejorative language.
I. THE KEENE DECISION
The focus of appellee Keene's challenge to FARA was nar-
row. He did not question the authority of Congress to identify
or to label foreign material as foreign. What he did challenge
was FARA's use of the term "political propaganda" to describe
the material that he wanted to exhibit.
Enacted in 1938, the Foreign Agents Registration Act was
designed to be a disclosure statute. Its drafters hoped to cast a
"spotlight of pitiless publicity"' on individuals who circulated
material prepared outside the United States so that the U.S.
public could judge such material accordingly. In this way, the
Act was designed to "protect the national defense, internal se-
curity, and foreign relations of the United States.'
The Act and its accompanying regulations' ° require
agents'' of foreign principals 2 who engage in political activi-
5. 619 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
6. 107 S. Ct. at 1873.
7. Id.
8. H.R. REP. No. 1381, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. at 2 (1937) [hereinafter H.R. REP.
No. 1381].
9. Ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248-49 (1942) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 611 note (1982)).
10. 28 C.F.R. §§ 5.100-.801 (1987).
11. The Act defines "agent," in part, as "any person who acts as an agent, repre-
sentative, employee, or servant" of a foreign principal and who "engages within the
United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal."
22 U.S.C. § 61 l(c)(1) (1982). In general, certain United States press services are ex-
empt from registration, as are diplomats and their staff, individuals engaged in hu-
19871
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ties to file a detailed registration statement with the Depart-
ment of Justice."3 This requirement is imposed on all such
agents, whether they represent friendly or unfriendly govern-
ments. 1
4
Since 1942, however, those agents who distribute what the
Act defines as "political propaganda" must also file two copies
of the material with the Justice Department. 5 "Political propa-
ganda" is defined in FARA as any form of communication that
can be adapted to "prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce,
or in any other way influence" the U.S. public about the for-
eign relations of the United States or of a foreign country.'"
The Justice Department generally depends on the agent to
judge whether the material is "political propaganda."'17 The
Department does, however, employ a full-time reviewer to in-
spect and judge material distributed by agents.' 8
manitarian, religious, scholarly, scientific, or academic pursuits, individuals involved
strictly in the commercial activities of a foreign principal, lawyers representing but
not lobbying on behalf of foreign principals, and individuals who represent a govern-
ment whose defense the President deems vital to the interests of the United States.
22 U.S.C. §§ 611(d), 613 (1982).
12. The Act defines "foreign principal," in part, as "a government of a foreign
country." Id § 611(b)(l) (1982).
13. 22 U.S.C. § 612 (a)(l)-(3) (1982). The registration statement includes such
information as the agent's and the principal's identities and the activities the agent
performs on the principal's behalf. Id.
14. United States v. Kelly, 51 F. Supp. 362, 363 (D.D.C. 1943); Combating Totali-
tarian Propaganda: The Method of Exposure, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 107, 112 (1943) [hereinaf-
ter Combating Totalitarian Propaganda]. The National Film Board of Canada, for in-
stance, is an agency of the Canadian government, and has been registered with the
Justice Department since 1947. See Block v. Meese, 793 F. 2d 1303, 1306 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
15. Act of April 29, 1942, ch. 263, 4(a) 56 Stat. 248, 255 (codified as amended at
22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1982).
16. 22 U.S.C. § 611(j)(1982). The definition also includes material that "advo-
cates, advises, instigates, or promotes any racial, social, political, or religious disor-
der, civil riot, or other conflict involving the use of force or violence in any other
American republic." Id. § 611 (j)(2). See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
17. Second Declaration ofJoseph E. Clarkson, Chief, Registration Unit, Internal
Security Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Joint Appendix at 52,
Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987) ("[i]n many, if not in most cases, the regis-
trants themselves determine that the FARA's disclosure and labeling requirements
apply to their dissemination of specific films"). For instance, British Information
Services, an agency of the British Government, marks everything that leaves its of-
fices as "political propaganda," whether the document concerns the Falkland Islands
or the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew. Telephone interview with Arthur Austin, Infor-
mation Assistant, British Information Services (Aug. 18, 1987).
18. Canadian Films and the Foreign Agents Registration Act: Oversight Hearing Before the
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If the material meets the statutory definition of "political
propaganda," the agent must inform the Justice Department of
the "places, times, and extent of [its] transmittal."' 9 The agent
must also make certain that the material is "conspicuously
marked at its beginning" with a label that sets forth the agent's
and the principal's name and business, the fact that registra-
tion statements are available to the public at the Justice De-
partment, and a disclaimer stating that registration of the
agent does not indicate approval of the material's contents by
the United States government.20 Failure to disclose the neces-
sary information, or wilful dislosure of false information, is a
criminal offense.2 '
According to the appellee in Keene, "political propaganda"
is an inherently derogatory term that unconstitutionally im-
pugned the credibility of his speech and exposed him to polit-
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1983) [hereinafter Canadian Films] (statement of D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). According to Mr. Jen-
sen, the reviewer's job "necessarily involves some discretion and expertise, primarily
a sensitivity to the leading political themes of the day .... Review of the films is
strictly limited to whether they meet the statutory criteria. The reviewer is not per-
mitted to speculate about the motive or bias of the author; the standard is set forth in
the definition. The test, in two words, is political advocacy." Id. The three Canadian
films in question are examples of material submitted to and screened by the Justice
Department's reviewer and subsequently judged "political propaganda." Keene v.
Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1516 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
19. 22 U.S.C. § 614(a) (1982), 28 C.F.R. § 5.401 (a), (b). The so-called dissemi-
nation report also requires the agent to submit to the Justice Department the
"[n]ame of station, organization, or theater using" the agent's film, the "(d]ate or
dates" shown, and the "[e]stimated attendance." See Form OBD-69 (now CRM-159),
Joint Appendix at 17, Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
20. 22 U.S.C. § 614 (b) (1982). The standard identification statement reads:
This material is prepared, edited, issued, or circulated by (name and address
of registrant) which is registered with the Department of Justice, Washing-
ton, D.C., under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as an agent of (name
and address of foreign principal). Dissemination reports on this film are
filed with the Department of Justice where the required registration state-
ment is available for public inspection. Registration does not indicate ap-
proval of the contents of this material by the United States Government.
Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
Both registration and dissemination reports are public record. 22 U.S.C. § 616(a)
(1982).
FARA's accompanying regulations require an agent who transmits a film con-
taining "political propaganda" to submit "either a film strip showing the label re-
quired by section 4(b) of the Act or an affidavit certifying that the required label has
been made a part of the film." 28 C.F.R. § 5.400(c) (1987).
21. 22 U.S.C. § 618(a).
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ical attack and public censure.2 2 The Federal District Court of
the Eastern District of California agreed, and, in 1983, perma-
nently enjoined the Department ofJustice from using the term
"political propaganda" in connection with the films. 23
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the stat-
ute's definition of the term "political propaganda" is "neutral
and evenhanded."'2 4 The lower court's holding was based "not
on what the statute actually says, requires, or prohibits," stated
the Court, "but rather upon a potential misunderstanding of
its effect."-25 The Court reasoned that the Act neither prohib-
ited the appellee from showing the material, nor prevented
him from "combat[ing] any such bias simply by explaining"
that the films had not been officially censured by the Justice
Department.26 In short, it placed "no burden ' 27 on the appel-
lee's speech. The Court thus distinguished Lamont v. Postmaster
General,28 in which the Court had struck down as burdensome a
postal statute requiring addressees to request mail delivery of
"communist political propaganda" sent to them.29 Moreover,
the Court reasoned, FARA's "political propaganda" sections
succeeded in providing "additional disclosures that would bet-
ter enable the public to evaluate the import of the propa-
ganda." 30 By contrast, the lower court's injunction on the use
of the term withheld information from the public-specifically,
the fact that the United States government had determined the
material to be "political propaganda."'" This "paternalistic
strategy of protecting the public from information" could not
22. Brief of Appellee at 8, Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
23. Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1III (E. D. Cal. 1983).
24. 107 S. Ct. at 1873. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, was
joined by Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun wrote
the dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Justice Scalia took no part
in the consideration or decision of the case, presumably because he had written the
circuit court opinion in a similar case, Block v. Meese, 793 F. 2d 1303 (D.C. Cir. ),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986); see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
25. 107 S. Ct. at 1870.
26. Id. at 1871.
27. Id.
28. 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see infra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
29. 381 U.S. at 305. The Keene Court reasoned that the offending element in
Lamont was the government's physical detention of the addressee's mail, not the
mail's "mere designation as 'communist political propaganda.' " Meese v. Keene,
107 S. Ct. at 1871.
30. 107 S. Ct. at 1871.
31. Id.
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stand, stated the Court.3 2
Second, the Court ruled that while the appellee's proof of
harm from the application of FARA was sufficient to confer
standing,"3 it fell "far short" of proving that the Act "has had
the effect of censorship. 34
Finally, concluded the Court, its duty is to "construe legis-
lation as it is written, not as it might be read by a layman."3 5
II. WORDS OF WAR: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history makes clear, however, that the leg-
islators who used the "political propaganda" language under-
stood the term to have negative connotations. The Foreign
Agents Registration Act was Congress's attempt to control
32. Id. The Court relied for this conclusion on Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In that case, the Court
rejected a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from advertising their prices
on prescription drugs.
33. 107 S. Ct. at 1867. The plaintiff in a similar case had lost on the issue of
standing at the trial-court level because the district court deemed the term "political
propaganda" to be "neutral." See Block v. Smith, 583 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (D.D.C.
1984). The Circuit Court reversed on the issue of standing but found for the govern-
ment on the first amendment issue, claiming that the term "political propaganda" as
statutorily defined carried no indication of government disapproval. Block v. Meese,
793 F. 2d 1303, 1309, 1312 (D.C. Cir. ) (Scalia,J.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3335 (1986).
With respect to the standing of plaintiff Keene, however, the government
presented a new argument. The government contended that FARA's labeling re-
quirement-which calls for the material to be "conspicuously marked at its begin-
ning" with the identification statement-applied only to registered agents and not to
subsequent distributors, such as the plaintiff Keene. Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp.
1513, 1515 (E.D. Cal. 1983); see 22 U.S.C. § 614(b). Because the plaintiff was free to
remove the label, argued the government, he lacked standing. The lower court had
termed the argument regarding removable labels "frankly surprising" in light of the
Congressional intent to inform hearers of the origin of material covered by FARA.
569 F. Supp. at 1519 n.2. "[N]o reasonable reader of the statute and regulations
could have imagined that the recipient of the material was free to remove the la-
bel . I..." d. at 1519. As the lower court recognized, the government's position
provided a surefire method for "frustrat[ing) Congressional intent." Id. The
Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether or not the label is removable
because it found for the plaintiff on the issue of standing. See 107 S. Ct. at 1867.
34. 107 S. Ct at 1873. The Court cited a number of foreign films that had been
labeled "political propaganda" and released in the United States as proof that FARA
does not suppress speech. The titles include: Berlin Means Business and More (Berlin
Economic Development Corporation); Hong Kong Style (Government of Hong Kong);
A Conversation with Golda Meir (Consulate General of Israel); and Ballad of a Soldier
(Sovexportfilm). Id. at 1872 n.17.
35. Id. at 1873.
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"pernicious propaganda" 6 by disclosing the identity of its au-
thors.
Congress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act in
the uneasy pre-war year of 1938 because it was alarmed by the
vast amounts of Nazi propaganda then circulating in the
United States.3 7 One year earlier the House Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee,3 8 formed to investigate Nazi and other sub-
versive foreign propaganda 3 had reported "incontrovertible
evidence.., that there are many persons in the United States
representing foreign governments or foreign political groups,
who are supplied ... with funds and other materials to foster
un-American activities."40 Most of the material distributed by
such persons was aimed either at creating racial and religious
intolerance in the United States,4 or at accomplishing "[t]he
overthrow by force or violence of [our] republican form of
government."4 The tone of the material was "violent, vitriolic,
and scurrilous. ' 43 It was, in short, "vicious and un-American
propaganda."4 4
Worse than the material's tone, however, was its anonym-
ity. Much of the material either was unidentified in origin, or
was distributed under false U.S. credentials, thereby sparing its
authors the heightened scrutiny that many recipients in the
United States would have applied to foreign material.45 The
36. H.R. REP. No. 1381, supra note 8, at 2.
37. Act ofJune 8, 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938). The House committee that
recommended passage noted in its report that, "During the past 2 years this country
has been flooded with propaganda material .... Investigation of Nazi and Other Propa-
ganda, H.R. REP. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935) [hereinafter Nazi Propa-
ganda] (quoting Committee chairman, Representative John W. McCormack of Massa-
chusetts). The Nazi Party alone had shipped literally "tons of propaganda literature"
into the United States as part of its "strenuous efforts ... to enlist" Americans of
German descent. Id. at 3. In addition, the committee found evidence of propaganda
disseminated by the Third International in Moscow through the American Commu-
nist Party. Id. at 13.
38. The full name of the committee was the Special Committee on Un-American
Activities. H.R. Res. 198, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 13 (1934) [hereinafter
H.R. Res. 198].
39. H.R. Res. 198, supra note 38, at 13.
40. H.R. REP. No. 1381, supra note 8, at 1-2.
41. Nazi Propaganda, supra note 37, at 2.
42. Id. at 13.
43. Id. at 11.
44. Id. at 5.
45. See, e.g., id. at 5 (Nazi group in United States headed by American citizen "in
an effort to give the organization the appearance of being 'American' in character").
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House Un-American Activities committee recommended that
Congress enact a statute that would publicize subversive activi-
ties of such propagandists, "so that the American people may
know those who are engaged in this country by foreign agen-
cies to spread doctrines alien to our form of government. 46
Thus, the Act's basic strategy was not to limit or deter speech
but to provide additional information "so that hearers and
readers may not be deceived by the belief that the information
comes from a disinterested source."47 It required merely that
agents of foreign principals identify themselves, their princi-
pals, and their business arrangements to the federal govern-
ment, and thus theoretically to the public at large.48
Despite the ominous times, the drafters of FARA pro-
duced a remarkably sophisticated piece of legislation. For one
thing, the statute was free of the heated language that had
characterized the Congressional reports and hearings preced-
ing its passage. 49 For another, while earlier statutes had pro-
hibited dissemination of subversive information, 50 FARA ex-
During hearings on the bill (H.R. 1591), Representative McCormack was asked
whether publicity would be a deterrent to the dissemination of foreign propaganda.
He answered: "Yes .... It would be brought out in the open so that everybody would
know what it was being used for .... " Hearings on H.R. 1591, Before a Subcomm. of the
Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (un-
published), quoted in Combating Totalitarian Propaganda, supra note 14, at 112 n.20.
46. H.R. REP. No. 1381, supra note 8, at 2.
47. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting on
other grounds).
48. Act ofJune 8, 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (1938). The 1938 Act also set forth
exemptions and penalties, similar to those currently in existence. See id. § 1 (d) (defi-
nition of "agent of a foreign principal"), § 5 (penalties), 52 Stat. 631, 632-33; see also
supra notes 10-13, 21, and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., the Federal Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 793-798, 2388 (West 1976 & Supp. 1987)) (crime, pun-
ishable by imprisonment, fine, or death, for disclosure of military secrets); Sedition
Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (crime, punishable by a $2000 fine and two years
in prison, "if a person shall write, print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous and
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either
house of the Congress[,] or the President[,] with intent to defame . . . or to bring
them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or
either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States"). The Act,
whose constitutionality was never reviewed by the Supreme Court, expired on March
3, 1801. President Jefferson pardoned all those who had been convicted under it.
Congress also eventually repaid most of the fines. 1 T. EMERSON, D. HABER, & N.
DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 27-28 (4th ed. 1976).
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pressly permitted it.5 Conscious of the first amendment impli-
cations of the Act,52 FARA's drafters aimed to limit subversive
speech not by classifying it as such but by revealing informa-
tion about its source.5" The Act made no distinction as to the
content of material distributed; not only subversive propagan-
dists, but also tourist agents extolling the beauty of the Alps,
were required to register.5 4 In theory, the information col-
lected and made public would help those with nothing to hide,
while it would rob subversives of secrecy, their most potent
weapon. By requiring more, not less, information, FARA was
said to "implement[] rather than detract[] from the prized
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment." '55
The 1938 law did not work, however. Only three years af-
ter its passage, FARA was declared "a dead letter" by Congres-
sional consultants.56 Meanwhile, U.S. allies were at war, and
Axis propaganda was pouring into the United States at an even
greater rate than before the passage of the Act. 57 Congress de-
bated how best to strengthen "investigation of subversive ac-
tivities."15 8 Eleven days after Pearl Harbor, the House recom-
51. H.R. REP. No. 1381, supra note 8, at 2 ("[pernicious] propaganda is not pro-
hibited under the proposed bill").
52. Id. ("this bill does not in any way impair the right of freedom of speech, or of
a free press, or other constitutional rights").
53. /d
54. Combating Totalitarian Propaganda, supra note 14, at 110. Legislators thus com-
pared FARA to the National Food and Drug Act, which required labeling of foods for
health reasons. H.R. REP. No. 1381, supra note 8, at 3.
55. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting on
other grounds).
56. 87 CONG. REC. APP. A4417, A4419 (1941). The main problem, according to
the Institute of Living Law, was "amazingly inept" administration by the govern-
ment. The agents' names had never been alphabetized, let alone indexed. Combating
Totalitarian Propaganda, supra note 14, at 115. As a result, the bill was of "no practical
importance in exposing the propaganda activities it was designed to expose." 87
CONG. REC. APP. A4417, A4419.
57. Amending Act Requiring Registration of Foreign Agents: Hearings on H.R. 6045
Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30
(1941) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 6045] ("[tlhere is an enormous problem here.
The problem has grown rather than lessened, since the passage of the act of
1938.... And [the propaganda is now] frequently better concealed") (statement of
Adolf A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State).
58. 87 CONG. REC. 10,048 (1941), 88 CONG. REc. 802 (1942). The House passed
proposals to include specific references in the definitions of"person" and "agent of a
foreign principal" to the Communist Party of the United States, the German-Ameri-
can Bund, and the Kyflhauserbund. 87 CONG. REC. at 10,062 (Dec. 19, 1941). The
floor amendments were defeated in conference committee, H.R. REP. No. 1662, 77th
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mended amendments to FARA,5 which were passed five
months later.6°
The 1942 amendments added the "political propaganda"
sections to the Act. 6' They also required foreign propagandists
not only to register but also to submit copies of their "political
propaganda" to the Justice Department.62 It seems clear that
the legislators understood "political propaganda" to be a neg-
ative term. The hearings preceding the passage of the 1942
amendments reveal an ongoing if not heightened concern with
"colored and twisted"6 materials, "bad political organiza-
tions, '"64 and "totalitarian infiltration."65 The legislators re-
sponded to this concern by creating a statutory definition that
made use of such words as "prevail upon ' 6 6 and "indoctri-
nate,"' 67 and that purported to apply to material that "insti-
gates ...disorder, civil riot, or ...the use of force or vio-
lence."68 The drafters of the 1942 amendments defined "polit-
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), chiefly on the ground that the Act already applied to mem-
bers of such groups. H.R. REP. No. 1662, supra, at 3. The House then agreed to the
conference report. 88 CONG. REC. 806 Uan. 28, 1942).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1547, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1547]. The day before the printing of the report, Representative Springer of Indiana
had reminded his colleagues that, "We are in war, and we must prepare to defend
ourselves not alone on the ocean but [also] within our borders. This legislation is
intended to meet that emergency at this particular moment.... Our people will not
tolerate any activities which are not wholly and truly American. All un-American ac-
tivities must cease in our country and all sinister and secretive methods used by all
agents of foreign principals must now end. Our thoughts are for our own Nation." 87
CONG. REC. 10,055 (1941).
60. Act of April 29, 1942, ch. 263, 56 Stat. 248.
61. Act of April 29, 1942, ch. 263, §§ 1(j), 4(a)-(b), 56 Stat. 248, 250-51, 255.
62. Act of April 29, 1942, ch. 263, § 4(a)-(b), 56 Stat. 248, 255. For an excellent
discussion of all amendments to the Act, see Bello, Legislative History of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act, in REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENTS: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL
GUIDE 21-28 (1981) [hereinafter Legislative History].
63. Hearings on H.R. 6045, supra note 57, at 13 (statement of L.M.C. Smith,
Chief, Special Defense Unit, Department of Justice).
64. Id. at 20 (statement of L.M.C. Smith).
65. Id. at 48 (statement of L.M.C. Smith); see also id. at 29 (during war "the tech-
nique of infiltration, of propaganda, of internal organization in another country" go
on) (statement of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State); id. at 52 ("these
totalitarian influences" best combated by "informing our people and keeping them
continuously informed of who was who and what was what") (statement of Rep.
Voorhis of California).
66. 22 U.S.C. § 611(j) (1982).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 61 l(j)(2). This subsection, which refers more completely to "the use of
force or violence in any other American republic," was added in response to the
194 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 11: 184
ical propaganda" in a "fairly broad''69 manner not because
they intended it to be neutral, but because they wanted to reg-
ulate nearly anything that a registered agent distributed.7 ° The
1942 amendments were designed to be "the most effective
method of combating ' 7 1 foreign propaganda, which Congress
recognized as "part of the machinery of making war. "72
During the 1950s and 1960s the government took full ad-
vantage of FARA's broad definition of political propaganda.
During that time the Post Office Department and the Customs
Bureau engaged in a large-scale program of seizure and de-
recommendations approved at the so-called Pan-American Conference, held at Ha-
vana, Cuba, in July 1940. Hearings on H.R. 6045, supra note 57, at 10, 11. At that
conference the United States and twenty central and South American nations drew
up plans to protect each other should the war in Europe spread to the American
hemisphere. Stowell, The Habana Conference and Inter-American Cooperation, 35 AM. J.
INT'L L. 123 (1941). One of the signatories' chief concerns was "the subversive ac-
tion of foreign agents in this hemisphere." Stowell, supra, at 124. The signatories
agreed to consult together should any of the republics be "menaced" by "pressure,
propaganda, threats" or other challenges to "their existing democratic systems." Fi-
nal Act and Convention, Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Amer-
ican Republics, July 21-30, 1940, art. VI, para. 1-2, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 24, 1940,
Vol. 3, No. 61, at 127, 132; DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug. 31, 1940, Vol. 3, No. 62, at 178.
69. H.R. REP. No. 1547, supra note 59, at 3, 5. The House Report defended the
breadth of the definition by explaining that it affected only those who were already
required to register. Id.
70. Hearings on H.R. 6045, supra note 57, at 18 ("once they are registered agents
and have been compelled to register, then we want to get a fairly broad coverage of
the type of material that they distribute") (statement of L.M.C. Smith).
71. H.R. REP. No. 1547, supra note 59, at 4. Early prosecutions under FARA are
further indications of what sort of activity Congress intended to target. In 1943, for
instance, the Department of Justice indicted an ostensibly fraternal association, its
subsidiary, and twenty-seven of its members with conspiracy to violate FARA and the
Notification Act by concealing the fact that they were large-scale propaganda arms of
the Third Reich. United States v. German-American Vocational League, 153 F.2d
860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946); see also Activities of Nondiplomatic Repre-
sentatives of Foreign Principals in the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations, 88th Cong., I st Sess. 69-70 (1963) [hereinafter Activities of Nondiplomatic
Representatives] (statement by the Department of Justice). Of the nineteen prosecu-
tions brought pursuant to FARA between 1939 and 1945, fourteen concerned Ger-
man or Soviet agents. Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives, supra, at 64-70; see, e.g.,
Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943) (overturning conviction of an agent of
German principal); United States v. Auhagen, 39 F. Supp. 590 (D.D.C. 1941) (deny-
ing motion regarding taking of deposition of German national in case where fellow
German national had been indicted for wilful failure to register).
72. Hearings on H.R. 6045, supra note 57, at 29 (statement of Adolf A. Berle, Jr.).
Said one Congressman: "Propaganda [is] one of the most powerful weapons on
earth. In very recent years its tremendous influence has come to be more and more
clearly recognized." 87 CONG. REC. 10,051 (Dec. 19, 1941) (statement of Rep. Mc-
Laughlin).
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struction of publications mailed from foreign, and particularly
Soviet-bloc, nations. 73 Such foreign material-whether polit-
ical tract or chess manual-fit within the broad standard of
"political propaganda" that Congress had adopted in 1942. TM
That FARA, originally a disclosure statute, could be used
to prevent dissemination was even then considered "at sharp va-
riance with the statutory language and purpose" by one com-
mentator.75 President John F. Kennedy tried to put an end to
the program in early 1961,76 but the following year Congress
essentially reinstated it. 77 Not until 1965 did the Supreme
Court strike down the mail program on first amendment
grounds.78
The following year FARA was amended in the hope of
changing its focus from propagandists to lobbyists. 79 The Sen-
ate report recommending passage of the amendments stated
73. Note, Government Exclusion of Foreign Political Propaganda, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1393 (1955). The material detained ranged from copies of Pravda and Izvestia to a
shipment of Lenin's The State and the Revolution, ordered by Brown University for a
history course. Id. at 1393, 1394 n.10. In one instance a non-Russian-speaking Cus-
toms Department employee in St. Paul, Minnesota, was handed a Russian-English
dictionary and told to search a warehouse full of detained material for "Communist
propaganda." See Schwartz & Paul, Foreign Communist Propaganda in the Mails: A Report
on Some Problems of Federal Censorship, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 626 (1959), citing Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 230
(1951).
Authority to proceed with the program was based on a 1940 opinion of the At-
torney General regarding the combined effect of FARA and the Espionage Act of
1917. Note, supra, at 1395.
74. Schwartz & Paul, supra note 73, at 633. Chess for Beginners was one of the
detained titles. Id.
75. Note, supra note 73, at 1401.
76. Schwartz, The Mail Must Not Go Through-Propaganda and Pornography, II
UCLA L. REv. 805, 805 & n.1, 806 (1964). On March 17, 1961, the White House
Press Secretary announced that the President, after consulting with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney Gen-
eral, had ordered mail confiscation to stop immediately, because it served "no useful
intelligence function." Id.
77. Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
793, § 305, 76 Stat. 832, 840 (adding 39 U.S.C. § 4008 (1962)),found unconstitutional
by Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
78. Lamont, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
79. Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966). Congress passed a number of stat-
utes after 1938 that dealt more directly with subversives than did FARA. See, e.g., ch.
897, 54 Stat. 1201 (1940), (the "Voorhis Anti-Propaganda Act"); Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, §§ 1-32, 64 Stat. 987 (current version codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.); Communist Con-
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that FARA had "through the years been too narrowly enforced
with the emphasis placed on subversive or potentially subver-
sive agents." '8 Nevertheless, by retaining the outdated "polit-
ical propaganda" language, the 1966 amendments did little to
rid the Act of its stigmatizing effect.8 A 1977 report prepared
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that the
language and administration of FARA were "vestiges of the
law's antecedents. '8 2  Furthermore, these vestiges were
"play[ing] hob with its effective operation."8 The association
of the Act with subversives "ha[d] stigmatized the registration
process" and thus made voluntary compliance by registrants
difficult to ensure.8 4 The study recognized that merely comply-
ing with the Act left registrants with the feeling that they were
"making admissions with criminal or subversive overtones."85
trol Act of 1954, ch. 886, § 2, 68 Stat. 775, 775-76 (current version codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 782, 784, 785, 790-793, 841-844 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
In addition, Congress was concerned about the problem of United States lawyers
who represented foreign interests but failed to disclose this fact to the representa-
tives and senators whom they lobbied-a new twist on the old, anonymous Nazi
propaganda problem that had originally prompted the passage of FARA. Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance on H.R. 12154, Sugar Act Amendments of 1962, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 357-58 (1962); see also Note, Regulating Nondiplomatic Activities of Repre-
sentatives of Foreign Governments in the United States, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 977 (1963);
Note, Disclosure Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as Amended, 14 W. RES.
L. REV. 579 (1963). Foreign interests preferred to use U.S. nationals rather than
their own diplomats because they believed--correctly-that increased familiarity with
the political system would yield better results. See Berman & Heineman, Lobbying by
Foreign Governments on the Sugar Act Amendments of 1962, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
416, 419 (1963).
80. S. REP. No. 875, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1964).
81. AMERICAN LAW DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 95TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT 14 (Senate Foreign Relations
Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter C.R.S. REPORT].
82. C.R.S. REPORT, supra note 81, at 13.
83. id.
84. Id. Enforcement of FARA has remained spotty at best. A 1980 General Ac-
counting Office report noted that the number of agents registered represented only
"the tip of the iceberg;" that awareness of FARA among officials in the Departments
of State, Commerce, the International Trade Commission, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the
military services "was limited or non-existent." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENT REGIS-
TRATION, Enclosure I, 1-6 (1980) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. In addition, only fifty-
one percent of registrants were reporting the required information adequately. Id. at
3. There was no information on whether the public found the files satisfactory. Id. at
4.
85. C.R.S. REPORT, supra note 81, at 14.
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENTS
Like other courts considering the Keene question, the
Supreme Court cited reputable dictionaries and experts as
proof that the word "propaganda" has both neutral and pejo-
rative definitions.86 The Court agreed that many people under-
stand the word to bear negative connotations;8 7 indeed, the
Court has itself used the word to disparage. 8
The real issue was not, however, an exercise in semantics.
Film is a form of speech protected by the first amendment.8 9
The appellee demonstrated that a government act threatened
to cause him harm.90 At issue was the tension between the ap-
pellee's freedom of speech and the interests, if any, of the
United States in labeling material "political propaganda." Tra-
ditionally, the government must prove9' that any restrictions it
places on the content of speech serve compelling government
interests. 2 Furthermore, these restrictions must be narrowly
86. See Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1869-70 nn.10,11 (1987); see also Block
v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111,
1121-22 (E.D. Cal. 1985). The California court recognized, however, that "these dic-
tionary meanings have little if anything to do with the use of the word 'propaganda'
in ordinary speech." 619 F. Supp. at 1122.
87. See 107 S. Ct. at 1869. The Court recognized the public perception when it
decided in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of standing. The Court agreed that ex-
hibiting films classified as "political propaganda" would "substantially harm
[Keene's] chances for reelection and would adversely affect his reputation in the
community." Id. at 1868. Thus, the Court found itself in the anomalous position of
recognizing injury caused by the term on the one hand, but refusing to remedy it on
the other, claiming the injury was due not to the statute but to the public's mis-
perception of the statute. Id. at 1870.
As the lower court noted, "[i]t may be beyond the power of Congress to deter-
mine, for example, that all materials addressing public policy issues and originating
from foreign sources shall hereinafter be called 'poison' or 'obscenity.' There are
words that cannot be stripped [of] their nuance." Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513,
1522 (E.D. Cal. 1983).
88. See, e.g., Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding
municipal ban on political advertisements in city rapid-transit cars because riders
"would be subjected to the blare of political propaganda"). The Justice Department
has acknowledged that the Keene controversy stemmed "from the pejorative connota-
tion of the phrase 'political propaganda' . . . in the public mind." Statement of D.
Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department ofJustice,
Canadian Films, supra note 18, at 7.
89. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
90. 107 S. Ct. at 1867.
91. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
92. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980);
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tailored 93 to meet those interests. The Court will carefully
scrutinize 94 the government's argument.
A. Balance of Interests
Speech concerning public affairs has long been considered
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-govern-
ment. 95 Thus, the government must examine the interests
served by any restriction it places on the content of speech. 96
1. The Government's Interest
The Court did not articulate which, if any, compelling
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438-39 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
The "compelling government interest" test is only one of many standards ap-
plied in first amendment cases. Government action that restricts merely the time,
place, or manner of speech need only be reasonable. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
89 (1949) (upholding restriction on "loud and raucous" sound trucks on public
streets). At the other end of the spectrum is the test devised for prior restraint of
publication in New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (prior
restraint prohibited unless direct, immediate, and irreperable harm to the nation or
its people would result) (Stewart, J., concurring). A host of standards applies in dif-
ferent contexts along the first amendment spectrum. See, e.g., United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (incidental restriction on speech upheld if it furthers
important or substantial government interests unrelated to suppression of free
speech and is no greater than necessary); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1;*25 (1976) (per
curiam) (restriction on freedom of association sustainable only on showing of "suffi-
ciently important interest"); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) ("suffi-
cient" interest required to justify restriction on freedom of association); Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 596 (1982) (right of access to criminal
trials overridden by "compelling" government interest); Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577, 581 (1980) (right of access absent overriding interest
articulated in findings); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes,J.)
(content of speech regulable if there is a "clear and present danger that [it] will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent").
93. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 596; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 ("means closely
drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms"); Button, 371 U.S.
at 438 ("Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision
of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most pre-
cious freedoms") (citation omitted); see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301,
310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[i]n the area of First Amendment freedoms,
government has the duty to confine itself to the least intrusive regulations which are
adequate for the purpose").
94. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-
65.
95. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1965); see also Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. !
(1965) (political foundations of the first amendment).
96. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786.
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government interest justified its perpetuation of the term
"political propaganda.19 7 FARA's "political propaganda" sec-
tions could conceivably have been based on the grounds of na-
tional security.98 The Court has traditionally been reluctant to
question Congressional power in this sphere.99 Indeed, the
Court has stated that matters concerning the conduct of for-
eign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a repub-
lican form of government are "so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of government as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference." 00 Because of this judicial def-
erence, the Court has in the context of foreign affairs relaxed
the standard usually applied in domestic cases.' 0 ' FARA itself,
for instance, has proven exceptionally durable in the face of
challenges to its general constitutionality10 2 and to its registra-
97. Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862, 1878 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (FARA intended to "protect the na-
tional defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States").
99. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961):
Means for effective resistance against foreign incursion-whether in the
form of organizations which function ... as "agents" of a foreign power, or
in the form of organizations which ... make themselves the instruments of a
foreign power-may not be denied to the national legislature....
... But where the problems of accomodating [competing and urgently
demanding values] . . .the legislative judgment as to how that [external]
threat may best be met consistently with the safeguarding of personal free-
dom is not to be set aside merely because the judgment ofjudges would...
have chosen other methods.
Id. at 95-96 (footnote omitted); see also Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915)
(upholding statute depriving a woman of her U.S. citizenship upon her marriage to
an alien because the Court "should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing
[the] powers [of the political branches]").
100. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (footnote omit-
ted).
101. See, e.g., Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588-90, 596-98; see also Narenji v. Civiletui,
617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (requiring only a "rational basis" for classifica-
tions among aliens since foreign policy considerations may be involved), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 957 (1980); Close, FARA: A Constitutional Perspective, in THE REGISTRATION OF
FOREIGN AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE 273, 275-78,
284 (1981) (courts defer to Congressional opinion where foreign policy is involved);
cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("any rule of constitutional law that would
inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to changing
world conditions should be adopted only with the greatest caution").
102. United States v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951).
Peace Information, the first case explicitly to affirm the constitutionality of the Act. held
that authority for FARA could be found in two bases of Congressional power: first, its
enumerated power to regulate internal affairs and its implied power to carry out
those enumerated powers; and second, in Congress's inherent power over external
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tion, 03 disclosure, 04 and labeling 0 5 requirements. It has with-
stood charges of selective prosecution.'1 6 Now its statutory
definition of "political propaganda" has been upheld as
well. 0 7
Foundation in the national-security power need not, how-
ever, end the inquiry. The Court has often recognized that "all
governmental power-even the war power, the power to main-
tain national security, or the power to conduct foreign affairs-
is limited by the Bill of Rights."'0 8 When individual freedoms
relations. Id The Peace Information court was relying on United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), which had held that the power of the
federal government in external affairs was inherent and pre-Constitutional, having
passed from Great Britain to the United States at the moment of independence. Cur-
tiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316-18; see also Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251
(1943) ("[FARA] implements rather than detracts from the prized freedoms guaran-
teed by the First Amendment") (Black, J., dissenting on other grounds); Attorney
Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd on other
grounds, 668 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1982); Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 346 F.
Supp. 1384, 1390 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1080 (1972).
103. See Peace, Information, 97 F. Supp. at 255.
104. See Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 465 F.2d 1405 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1080 (1972).
105. See Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aft'd, 668 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1982).
106. See Attorney Gen. v. Irish N. Aid Comm., 530 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1982); Attorney Gen. v. 1'he Irish People, Inc.,
502 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd, 684 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1172 (1983). The Irish People circuit court stated that, "It is clear that Congress
intended to allow the Attorney General to be motivated in part by foreign policy,
international political, and national security considerations [in enforcing FARA]....
A showing that the Attorney General acted in such a way is not a showing of im-
proper motive at all." Irish People, 684 F.2d at 934. One of ihe concurring judges
added that she could not agree that "FARA enforcement may permissibly be focused
on one side (i.e., the side currently supported by the Administration) of foreign pol-
icy controversies that may be the subject of debate among Americans .... In this
context, . . . issues of constitutionally improper motivation surface disturbingly....
[S]ome unevenness was built into [FARA].... But that unevenness may not permissi-
bly be expanded through prosecutorial discretion to discredit views currently in dis-
favor while withholding the 'spotlight of pitiless publicity' from views our govern-
ment... preferis] be presented to the American public in a more-palatable form." Id.
at 956 (Wald, J., concurring) (emphasis removed).
107. Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987).
108. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 782-83 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (citing United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (statute making it a criminal
offense for employee of defense facility to be member of Communist Party struck
down despite Government's claim that statute was based in "war power"); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (even though restriction of travel to Cuba upheld
because individual constitutional rights were overridden by the "weightiest consider-
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are at stake, the Court must consider the government's claims
"in light of the individual freedoms."' 9 Even if national secur-
ity interests were implicated by the showing of the three Cana-
dian films, a point as to which there was no evidence, the Court
was still obligated to consider the interests of the appellee.
2. The Right to Speak
In Keene the Court reasoned that the "political propa-
ganda" language was not unconstitutional because it did not
rise to the level of censorship." 0 This rationale is an unneces-
sarily restrictive view of the guarantees of the first amendment,
however. The Court has held that "constitutional violations
may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling' effect of government
regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the
exercise of first amendment rights.""' In Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan,'"2 for instance, the Court struck down a state law au-
thorizing a state commission to designate certain books sold in
the state as morally "objectionable." Although the commission
was limited to "informal sanctions," the Court found that such
sanctions "may sufficiently inhibit the circulation of publica-
tions to warrant injunctive relief."'" 3 Similarly, in 1964 the
Court struck down a loyalty oath required as a condition of
employment by a government agency because those "sensitive
to the perils posed by the oath's indefinite language, avoid the
risk of loss of employment, and perhaps profession, only by
restricting their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe.
ations of national security," the Court rejected assumption "that simply because a
statute deals with foreign relations, it can grant the Executive totally unrestricted
freedom of choice"); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (struck
down denial of passports to American members of the Communist Party because of
claimed threats to national security); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) (statu-
tory inequality between naturalized and native-born citizens allegedly based on for-
eign relations power struck down)). See also New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971) (action by executive branch to enjoin publication of newspaper on
grounds of national security cannot stand unless direct, immediate, and irreperable
harm to the nation or its people would result).
109. Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 783.
110. 107 S. Ct. at 1873.
111. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (citing Baird v. State Bar, 401
U.S. 1 (1971)); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
112. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
113. Id. at 67.
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Free speech may not be so inhibited." "t4
In Keene the restriction on speech was no less inhibiting.
As the Court recognized, the Act presented the appellee with
the choice of exercising his freedom of speech or incurring the
public's suspicion." 5 By stating that the statutory language is
constitutional because it did not go so far as to censor the
plaintiff's speech," 6 the Court has erected an artificially high
standard for first amendment complaints. In the past, the
Court has recognized that government action may be unconsti-
tutional "even though it has only an indirect effect on the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights." '" 7
3. Access: The Right to Receive
The Court has referred in a number of contexts to a first
amendment right to receive information and ideas." 8 This
right extends to material originating from outside the United
States." 9 The Court has struck down statutes that placed un-
justifiable burdens on the right to receive, even when the stat-
114. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (oaths that state requires cer-
tain public employees to take, swearing, inter alia, that they are not "subversive per-
son[s]" violates first amendment). In another context, the Court struck down as vio-
lative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment a state statute re-
quiring the race of candidates to be indicated on the ballot. Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399, 402 (1964). This statute provided an unconstitutional vehicle for racial
bias, held the Court. Id. at 402.
115. 107 S. Ct. at 1869.
116. Id. at 1873.
117. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972).
118. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577, 581 (1980)
(press has right of access to places traditionally open to the public absent overriding
interest articulated in findings); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969) ("the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences" is "paramount" ); see also Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (state scheme barring pharmacists from advertising prices to public struck
down); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (private possession of obscene
material protected); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (statute requiring
labor organizers to register as a condition of soliciting membership in unions struck
down because it interfered with organizers' right to speak and workers' right to hear
what they had to say); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (munici-
pal ordinance prohibiting individuals from distributing unsolicited religious litera-
ture door-to-door struck down).
119. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978) ("(t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend on the identity of its source").
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utes implicated matters of foreign affairs. The case most
closely on point is Lamont v. Postmaster General.'20
In this landmark 1965 case, the Supreme Court for the
first time premised its rejection of Congressional legislation on
first amendment grounds.12' The plaintiff was notified in July
1963 by the Post Office that it would not deliver his copy of the
Peking Review #12 unless he wrote and requested delivery.' 22
The Post Office based its action on a statute 23 that permitted
it to detain and destroy all "communist political propa-
ganda."'' 24 The Supreme Court found that the affirmative obli-
gation by the addressee to request receipt of his mail violated
his fundamental first amendment right to receive ideas. 25 The
Court also objected to the "deterrent effect" 1 26 of the govern-
ment's designation of the material as "communist political
propaganda." Public officials "might think they would invite
disaster if they read what the Federal Government says con-
tains the seeds of treason," stated the Court.12 7
Much of the rationale of both the majority and concurring
opinions in Lamont could have been applied to Keene. First, the
Lamont Court was not concerned with the foreign-affairs impli-
cations of the postal regulation. Second, Lamont stands for the
120. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
121. The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, Detention of Mail Deemed "Communist Propa-
- ganda, " 79 HARV. L. REV. 154, 154 (1965). See aLso Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-
Rights ofAddressees to Receive "Communist Political Propaganda "Protected Under First Amend-
ment, 18 VAND. L. REV. 2043-45 (1965); Case Note, Constitutional Law--Freedom of
Speech-Right to Receive Mail Unimpeded by Government Interference-Lamont v. Postmas-
ter General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), 15 AM. U. L. REV. 114 (1965); Recent Decisions,
Constitutional Law-Postal Restriction of Communist Propaganda Deemed Invalid, 40 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 274 (1965).
122. 381 U.S. at 304.
123. The Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962 § 305, 76
Stat. 840 (1962) (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 4008(b) (Supp. IV 1962)), provided in part:
Mail matter, except sealed letters, which originates ... in a foreign country
and which is determined by the Secretary of the Treasury ... to be "commu-
nist political propaganda," shall be detained by the Postmaster General
upon its arrival for delivery in the United States ... and the addresssee shall
be notified that such matter has been received and will be delivered only
upon the addressee's request.
The statute was struck down in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
124. See 39 U.S.C. § 4008(b) (Supp. IV 1962), referring to 22 U.S.C. § 611(j)
("communist political propaganda" defined according to FARA).
125. 381 U.S. at 307, 308.
126. Id. at 307.
127. Id.
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broad principle that even if a statute is "not intended to con-
trol the content of speech, [and] only incidentally limit[s] its
unfettered exercise," 28 it is nevertheless unconstitutional.2 9
Any recipient would "feel some inhibition in sending for litera-
ture which federal officials have condemned as 'communist
political propaganda,' ,,t30 stated the Court. The fact that the
intrusion on first amendment rights was "only a minor one"
was irrelevant. '3
The question posed by Lamont was remarkably similar to
that of Keene. But in Lamont the Court was willing to state the
obvious: "communist political propaganda" is a derogatory
term, and the government's use of such a term deters
speech.13 2 In Lamont the Court recognized that "inhibition as
well as prohibition " of free speech can be unconstitutional. 3 3
B. Narrowly Tailored Language
Finally, the Court sustained the "political propaganda"
term despite the fact that not even the government cared for it.
The Department ofJustice has not merely been willing to dis-
pose of the term; 3 4 it is on record as supporting "the use of a
more neutral term [than 'political propaganda'] to denominate
information that must be labeled."' 3 5
Given the fact that the government did not cite any rea-
son-compelling or otherwise-for upholding "political prop-
aganda," and given the fact that the government has in the
past supported efforts to abandon FARA's outdated language,
the Court surely failed to apply exacting scrutiny to the gov-
128. Id. at 308.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 307.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 307.
133. Id. at 309.
134. Canadian Films, supra note 18, at 7 (statement of Assistant Attorney General
D. LowellJensen before a House subcommittee that when considering whether for-
eign material fits the FARA definition, the Justice Department's "test, in two words, is
political advocacy"). Thus, the Department has already retired the pejorative lan-
guage of FARA in favor of an ostensibly neutral standard.
135. Letter of Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults to Robert W. Kas-
tenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administra-
tion of Justice, of the House Committee on the Judiciary, Aug. 8, 1983 [hereinafter
Schmults Letter]. Appellee's Motion to Affirm, Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862
(1987) at Appendix k.
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ernment's restriction on speech. Instead, the Court's decision
permits the U.S. government to burden free speech gratui-
tously with the weight of a hostile label. That agents of both
friendly and unfriendly nations must bear this burden is no an-
swer to the constitutional objections; it merely proves that the
Department of Justice disparages the speech of friend and foe
alike. It is the ability of government to impose its classification
on speech that is truly paternalistic, for it shows little faith in
the ability of hearers to judge for themselves.
C. Congressional Action
There are, of course, legitimate ways to inform the public
of the foreign origin of material. Ten years ago a Congres-
sional report recommended that the best way "to accomplish
the removal of [the] stigma" surrounding registration under
FARA was to alter the "language used in the current stat-
ute."' 36 The report recommended replacing "propaganda"
with "promotional material."' 3 7 This language change would
"eliminate pejorative connotations," stated the report.'38 The
report noted that the Department of Justice was itself aware
that the terms deterred compliance among agents 3 9 by casting
"the mere representation of foreign clients in an unfavorable
light."' 4 ° Moreover, the report stated, the stigma associated
with being a foreign agent "is a significant obstacle to volun-
tary compliance today, a fact which jeopardizes the ability of
the [Justice Department] to gain proper disclosure."' 4 ' In
1983 Deputy Attorney General Edward C. Schmults informed
a House subcommittee that the Justice Department was ready
to replace "political propaganda" with "a more neutral term
like political 'advocacy' or 'information.' "142
Possibly because recent prosecution under FARA has
136. C.R.S. REPORT, supra note 81, at 13. The two other recommendations were
to adjust the provisions of the law to separate the concepts of lobbying and propa-
gandizing with subversive intent; and to reassign the administration of the Act to
another division of the Justice Department. Id.
137. Id. at 14.
138. Id. at 13-14.
139. C.R.S. REPORT, supra note 81, at 13-14.
140. Id. at 14.
141. Id.
142. Schmults Letter, supra note 135.
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been sporadic,14 - Congress has yet to enact any of the changes
recommended by the Congressional report or by Deputy At-
torney General Schmults.14 4 Four bills proposed in the past
ten years have also languished.1 45 Thus FARA, the product of
legislatures facing world war, retains its pejorative language
and sensibility. The "spotlight of pitiless publicity" envisioned
in 1938 succeeds now in shedding heat but not light on the
activities of agents of foreign principals.
The Supreme Court held more than forty years ago that
"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."' 46 Providing that all material of foreign origin indi-
cate its source is salutary consumer protection. But permitting
the federal government to disparage such material in the guise
of disclosing information to the public is an affront to the first
amendment. That the U.S. Supreme Court needlessly upheld
-such disparagement is frustrating. Congress should once again
143. See GAO REPORT, supra note 84, at 7-8. One of the more notable FARA
incidents of recent date concerned Billy Carter, who refused to register as an agent of
the Libyan government even though he had accepted $220,000 in payments for vari-
ous errands performed on that government's behalf. Carter was ultimately forced to
register. Safire, Igor and Billy, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1980, at A19, col. 5; N.Y. Times,
July 16, 1980, at A20, col. 1.
144. Senator George McGovern proposed amendments to FARA, based on the
C.R.S. REPORT, in 1977. See S. 2045, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The bill was re-
ferred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but hearings were never held, and
no further action was taken. Mehlman, FARA-Some Proposalsfor Reform, in THE RE-
GISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL
GUIDE, 323 n.24 (1981).
145. Senator McGovern's bill, see supra note 144, would have renamed FARA
the Federal Registration of Foreign Lobbying and Propaganda Act. It would have left
most of the Act, including the "political propaganda" sections, intact, while stepping
up enforcement provisions. S. 2045, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 28-33 (1977). In 1983
Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier, chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Rights, and the Administration of Justice, introduced legislation to
strike the "political propaganda" sections from FARA. H.R. 1969, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983). He reintroduced similar legislation in 1985. H.R. 3957, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985). Representatives Barney Frank and Howard Berman co-sponsored legis-
lation to change "political propaganda" to "advocacy material." H.R. 3827, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The latter bill would also have renamed FARA the Free
Trade in Ideas Judiciary Amendments of 1985. None of these bills has been adopted.
146. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (striking
down state statute requiring schoolchildren to salute the flag and pledge allegiance
to it).
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amend FARA, this time to remove its outdated, negative lan-
guage.
CONCLUSION
As a disclosure statute, FARA is as valid today as when it
was passed nearly fifty years ago. Attribution of source is the
key to the credibility of communication, for only by consider-
ing the speaker can the hearer judge the speech. The decision
in Meese v. Keene is not a step in the direction of free and in-
formed judgment, however. It is a retreat from the achieve-
ment of the original Foreign Agents Registration Act, which
was produced in times more feverish than our own.
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